THE COURT: Please be seated.

2 Mr. Short?

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MR. SHORT: Yes. Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Goodman?

MR. GOODMAN: Yes. Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Temkin?

MR. TEMKIN: Yes. Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have three letters in front of me that relate to Trammo Caribbean and Trammo Petroleum. There's a December 12th letter from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a December 12th letter from Trammo Caribbean and Trammo Petroleum, and then a December 14th supplemental letter from Trammo Caribbean and Trammo Petroleum.

The issues seem pretty straightforward. The first is whether there can be a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal in Puerto Rico I as to Trammo Caribbean; that seems clear. And the question is, what about Puerto Rico II with respect to Trammo Caribbean? Then, with respect to Trammo Petroleum, it was dismissed from Puerto Rico I for lack of personal jurisdiction, how could it be much different in Puerto Rico II?

That's our little agenda. It's always helpful if the Court tells you what she's thinking so you know what to argue for or against, so to speak.

I've said already, if it can be the 41(a)(1) dismissal in Puerto Rico I by Trammo Caribbean, in Puerto Rico II, I

think the dismissal has to be with prejudice, not without prejudice, because the Delaware law under which it's being dismissed is analogous to a statute of limitations dismissal, and that should be with prejudice.

As far as Trammo Petroleum, Inc., which I should call
TPI for the sake of simplicity, it was dismissed in Puerto Rico
I for lack of personal jurisdiction. I can't imagine
anything's changed. I don't see why it wouldn't be dismissed
for the same reason in Puerto Rico II.

That's where I come out on the three issues. Anybody want to be heard?

MR. SHORT: If I may. In the Second Circuit, the presumption for a plaintiff seeking to dismiss its own claim is to grant without prejudice absolute --

THE COURT: I'm doing that under 41(a)(1) for the Puerto Rico I. But in Puerto Rico II, we're not under that rule. Period, full stop. We're not under 41. It was their responsive motion. It was converted to a summary judgment. You knew that. It was converted first to 12(b)(6), then was converted to a summary judgment. It is a responsive pleading in every way, and then the only question is with or without prejudice. So it's no longer your dismissal. It's not a voluntary dismissal.

MR. SHORT: No. Understood. In a 41(a)(2) context --

1 MR. SHORT: Understood, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Just ignore me. Go ahead and talk.

MR. SHORT: I'll move on to the next item.

The issue of the dissolution of Trammo Caribbean.

Although counsel for Trammo Caribbean has said that it is analogous to a statute of limitation is a different argument, it's a different beast. It was first argued as a 12(b)(2) motion as a personal jurisdiction item.

I think it's important to recognize that in Delaware,
Trammo Caribbean had an opportunity to engage in a windup
process that would have shielded its shareholders and
directors. It did not engage in that process. Now it seeks to
have a with prejudice dismissal that would have the same
effect.

There would be a prejudice to the Commonwealth if it were dismissed with prejudice because it's possible it could be deemed as a dismissal on the merits. Because of the entities, like shareholders and directors, that may hold liability, the Commonwealth may be precluded to go after those entities in another forum.

I understand the Court's position on whether or not we can seek Trammo Caribbean here. My main concern for Commonwealth is whether or not we will be able in the future to go after the shareholder that received distributions in advance of the filing the certificate of dissolution or a director that

1 did not comply with statutory dissolution windup procedures. 2 That's the prejudice that the Commonwealth would experience. 3 If your Honor would like, I could move to Trammo Petroleum. 4 5 Well, in a minute. THE COURT: 6 MR. SHORT: Certainly. 7 THE COURT: I'm not sure I understand what you just 8 The party we're talking about is Trammo Caribbean. 9 MR. SHORT: Correct. 10 THE COURT: You're talking about worrying about 11 outside directors, or directors, or whatever. What's that got to do with the with prejudice dismissal as to Trammo Caribbean? 12 13 MR. SHORT: Because, if I could quote this small 14 section. We're concerned about claim preclusion that would bar 15 litigation of claims that were or could have been brought in 16 earlier litigation between the same parties or their privies. 17 We're concerned about the privies. The directors and the 18 shareholders --19 THE COURT: All right. So how about if it reads "with prejudice as to Trammo Caribbean only"? I think that does it. 20 21 MR. SHORT: Could we possibly include "and not its 22 shareholders or directors or privies"? 2.3 THE COURT: I have no problem with that. I don't 24 think it should bar that. Trammo Caribbean, that's whose

name -- and I wasn't aware of what you read about "or their

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privies". Where was that from that you read?

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MR. SHORT: That is from Burberry Ltd. v. Horowitz.

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It's a Second Circuit case from 2013, 534 Fed.App'x 41 at

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page 43.

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had in mind that it was with prejudice as to Trammo Caribbean,

THE COURT: Certainly was not what I had in mind. I

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and only Trammo Caribbean.

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Why don't you move to the third topic while you're at

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it, which is Puerto Rico II as to TPI. Is that what you were

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0 going to turn to?

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MR. SHORT: It would be for both Puerto Rico I and

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Puerto Rico II for Trammo Petroleum.

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THE COURT: I already dismissed Puerto Rico I based on

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lack of personal jurisdiction.

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not have been aware of supplemental briefing that occurred when

MR. SHORT: I understand. I think that the Court may

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Trammo opposed the Commonwealth's motion to revise prior

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orders. The reply from the Commonwealth included a number of

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documents that speak to personal jurisdiction. The

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Commonwealth is currently going to be filing a motion for

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reconsideration for those.

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I understand, your Honor. We don't take this lightly.

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Trammo Petroleum did contract and I do have --

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THE COURT: Then there's nothing more to say until I

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decide the reconsideration, because the bottom line is, Puerto

MR. SHORT: -- I believe in November, and it preceded

THE COURT: Before I ruled.

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1 | your most recent ruling.

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THE COURT: Why didn't you send it in right away and say, "This is a supplemental submission on personal jurisdiction. You better take this into account before you rule."

MR. SHORT: The initial opinion dismissing Trammo Petroleum was on a statute of limitations grounds.

THE COURT: No, I'm talking about this.

MR. SHORT: I understand. It's two steps, and if you could, pardon me, bear with me for a moment.

The initial opinion dismissing Trammo Petroleum, you reversed that --

THE COURT: I understand.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  SHORT: -- and for the first time ruled on personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Correct. But that was pending all along.

I just hadn't reached it the first time because I didn't need to, but it was a pending motion.

MR. SHORT: Between those two periods, the

Commonwealth submitted a reply to the Trammo defendant's

opposition to the Commonwealth's motion to revise prior orders.

It is a mouthful. Those documents were included at that time.

I'm not sure --

THE COURT: So you're saying I had it before me when I ruled, but I overlooked it.

1 MR. SHORT: Yes.

THE COURT: That's permitted. If it was in the record before the Court and the Court overlooked it, then the Court has to reconsider. Okay.

MR. SHORT: That being said, there is a new document that was November, and I understand your position on that.

THE COURT: Well, my position, so-called, is if it's newly discovered after my decision, you're allowed to raise it if it's newly discovered. But if you had it before the decision, you had an obligation to submit it.

MR. SHORT: I think the thought process --

THE COURT: But procedurally, procedurally, maybe I understand it. You were hoping there wouldn't be any change in the prior ruling, and personal jurisdiction was really not in play. It was only when the Court vacated that earlier opinion and reached personal jurisdiction that you had reason to note that you should have submitted that.

MR. SHORT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. So you probably can submit that.

The bottom line is, on Puerto Rico I and II with respect to

TPI, until I see the motion to reconsider, there's nothing more
to say. All I came on the bench ready to say is it has to be
the same. With respect to personal jurisdiction, it's both or
not either, they can't differ between them.

MR. SHORT: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: With respect to the with prejudice dismissal of Caribbean, if it excluded the -- you called it shareholders and directors and privies, then you have no problem.

MR. SHORT: I would need authority from the client, but I would be willing to recommend that.

THE COURT: Anybody want to be heard on this side of the table?

MR. GOODMAN: Yes, your Honor. Robert Goodman Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass.

This TCI was dissolved in 2007. Long time ago. Eight years ago.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. GOODMAN: To start talking about directors and shareholders from 2007, any statute of limitations I ever heard of would have run a long time before that.

THE COURT: That may well be. I don't know if they're ever going to do it, but all he's saying is that he doesn't want to be precluded with a with prejudice dismissal from trying.

If he turns around and sues some director now, the first thing that's going to happen is you're going to make a motion to dismiss for being time disbarred and probably ask for sanctions, too. It may be so time barred, what are you thinking? Bottom line, he'll never do it, but I guess he wants CEASEOMOB+€v-01898-VSB-VF Document 4348 Filed 12/29/15 Page 11 of 14 11